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This new dimension of post-Kantian thought must now be made to bear 
fruit beyond the most general formulations of the basic idea, with the 
twofold aim of providing foundations for natural inquiry and of securing 
philosophy a real basis in nature.
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A great difference is made to contemporary accounts of transcendental 
philosophy if the question is raised as to how far down its inquiries into the 
sources of cognitions extend. It is true that the transcendental deduction is 
designed to reset the orbit of metaphysics around experiences rather than things; 
and although there are exceptions, neither Kant nor his successor 
transcendentalists ceased to extend the inquiry into the ultimate grounds of 
cognition insofar as these are made possible not by objectives, but by what 
exceeds their being, that is, their formation. Indeed, it is in thinking sources, in 
descendence, that transcendental philosophy most achieves its objects. 
Transcendental philosophy does not consist only in the derivations of 
concepts legitimately applicable in experience and in demarcating the thresholds 
beyond which epistemological title is accordingly forfeit. It is true that 
transcendental derivability rearticulates the problem of ground such that it no 
longer subtends, as it did for Leibniz, the ascent from physics to metaphysics,
2
 
but takes the plane thus achieved to supplant the depth from which it was raised, 
and to ground the series of now only appearing natures on an Abgrund, an abyss 
or the unground.
3
 Yet “reason demands the unconditioned” (KRV A564/B592)4 
                                                          
1 Klaus Stein, Naturphilosophie der Frühromantik (Paderborn: Schöningh, 2004), 25. 
2 Leibniz, Principles of Nature and Grace, §7: “So far, we have spoken as simple physicists; now 
we must rise to metaphysics, by making use of the great principle . . . that nothing takes place 
without sufficient reason” in trans. Roger Ariew and Daniel Garber, in G.W. Leibniz Philosophical 
Essays (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1989), 209-210. 
3 “Unconditioned necessity, which we so urgently require as the last bearer of all things, is for 
human reason the true abyss [Abgrund]”, Immanuel Kant, Critique of Pure Reason (KRV), trans. 
Norman Kemp Smith (London and New York: Macmillan, 1929) cited according to the A/B edition 
pagination as per standard, at KRV A613/B641. Otherwise, Kant’s works are cited according to 
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that is necessary if grounds are to be thinkable at all. Ground cannot ‘precede’ 
the grounded since it cannot, by definition, be an element of experience, and only 
such elements can appear temporally ordered. But rather than concluding 
ontological nullity from epistemological partition, it is only by “carrying the 
empirical synthesis [of conditions] as far as the unconditioned” that reason “is 
enabled to render it absolutely complete; and the unconditioned is never to be 
met with in experience, but only in the idea” (KRV A409/B436). No deduction 
of grounds can achieve what reason demands, but reason cannot cease 
demanding it. Nor without the idea of an unconditioned ground can grounds be 
identified at all, since a ground is only a ground if it has a consequent, but not if 
it is itself consequent upon something else. “Absolute completeness” in the 
synthesis of conditions is therefore possible only on the basis of the 
transcendental idea which is nothing for experience. Accordingly, as it is the 
purpose of the antinomies to show, completeness in objective conditions of the 
possibility of objects cannot be achieved. By allocating the parts of judgments to 
their originating faculties and to transcendental ideas, transcendental logic is not 
equivalent to the distribution of epistemological title or to answering the question 
quid juris, since it divides the unconditioned from the conditioned, into what can 
and what cannot be synthesized into spatiotemporal objects. Accordingly, the 
distribution effected by transcendental logic extends the conditions of possibility 
which, as the paralogisms demonstrate, cannot be subjectively completed. 
Neither, as the Antinomies symmetrically show, can objective conditions be 
completed. What therefore underpins incompleteness is unconditioned; or, 
incompleteness is absolute for transcendental philosophy. 
 Being unconditioned, no experience thereof is possible. This means in 
particular that the role of the unconditioned ground of all determination cannot be 
schematized as prior or posterior to the series of conditions within which alone 
time has purchase. Nor therefore can conditions be schematized as accidents of a 
basic substance, nor again as standing in any causal relation to antecedents, since 
this would be to apply the understanding’s pure concepts of relation—substance 
and accident, along with mechanical and ultimately reciprocal causality—to a 
domain to which sense has no access. It is for this reason that the transcendental 
turn in philosophy has been considered a subjectivist supplanting of the 
‘dogmatic’ concept of ground, a metaphysics capable of abandoning the temporal 
and causal depth from which objects emerge. It is from this that the emphasis on 
“making” (Fichte), “manufacture” (Kant) or on the transcendental as a “new 
dimension” (Husserl) 5  becomes focal both for practical and speculative 
transcendentalism.  
                                                                                                                                                
Kants Werke, Königlich Preußische Akademie der Wissenschaften (AK), 29 vols (Berlin: de 
Gruyter, 1902). 
4  See also Kant, Critique of Judgment, hereafter KUK, trans. Werner S. Pluhar (Indianapolis: 
Hackett, 1987), AK V, 401: “Reason is a power of principles, and its ultimate demand aims at the 
unconditioned.” 
5 Fichte claims the core attitude of transcendental philosophy is “the world is something made.” 
Johann Gottlieb Fichte, System of Ethics, hereafter Ethics, trans. and eds. Daniel Breazeale and 
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 Notwithstanding the ubiquity of these practicist or productivist accounts, 
the “descendent” dimension, the pursuit of grounds, remains a vital element of 
transcendental philosophy, and involves transcendental philosophy in a 
systematic inquiry into causes that leads, ultimately, from metaphysics back to 
physics. Thus it leads on the one hand to the system of incomplete or regulative 
reciprocity presented as organic form in KUK § 65-6, where causes are 
reciprocally effects and effects causes, forming a series maintaining this 
“dependence both as it ascends and as it descends” (KUK AK V, 372).6 On the 
other hand, it leads to the system of the complete community of force and 
activity ‘deduced’ as the ether in the Opus postumum (62ff, AK XXI, 206ff). Yet 
Kant’s “second comment” on the table of categories to the categories of relation 
(KRV B110-111) had already laid the groundwork for both, or set reciprocity 
down as the Urform of all philosophy, according to Schelling’s reading of it.7 
The problem is this: either causal reciprocity goes all the way down, remaking 
the cosmos into the Platonic “cosmic animal;” or it is “regulatively” limited, as 
Kant maintains in KUK, by how we must think of organic beings; or again it is 
constitutively limited, as Fichte, Kant’s self-appointed heir in transcendental 
philosophy, seeks to show in ‘Propositions for the Elucidation of the Essence of 
Animals.’8 Yet animalization is not the only possible consequence of extended 
reciprocity. Kant’s ‘Ether Proofs,’ for example, hypothesize a dynamic 
reciprocity of force and activity as the possibilizing condition of our acting in the 
world, albeit at the cost of antinomizing time: either complete reciprocity of 
cause and effect eliminates priority and posteriority altogether; or the ascending-
descending reciprocity series hypothesized in KUK has no beginning or end. In 
both cases, natural history becomes a geography of arrested time.
9
 “True history 
is nothing but a continuous geography” (AK IX: 161). 
 Yet since transcendental philosophy originates from the project of the 
Universal Natural History and from the “fruitlessness” of “all attempts to prove 
the principle of sufficient reason” (KRV A783/B811), we take transcendental 
philosophy to be the attempt to complete the former, cosmogonic project given 
                                                                                                                                                
Günter Zöller (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 334. Kant writes, “He who would 
know the world must first manufacture it.” Immanuel Kant, Opus postumum, AK XXI, 41, 
hereafter OPP, trans. Eckart Förster (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993), 240. Husserl 
discusses the transcendental as Kant’s “new dimension” in Edmund Husserl, The Crisis of 
European Science and Transcendental Phenomenology, hereafter Crisis, trans. David Carr 
(Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1970), 11, 8-121. 
6 Kant provides the classic statement of organic reciprocity at KUK, AK V, 374: In thinking of a 
“natural purpose” we must “think of each part as an organ that produces the other parts (so that 
each reciprocally produces the other,” and constitutes “an organized and a self-organizing being.” 
7 F.W.J. Schelling, “On the Possibility of a Form of all Philosophy,” in Schellings Werke (hereafter 
SW), 24 vols., ed. K.F.A. Schelling (Stuttgart and Augsburg: Cotta, 1856-61), band I, 107; trans. 
Fritz Marti, in The Unconditional in Human Knowledge (Lewisburg: Bucknell University Press, 
1980), 52. 
8  Fichte, “Sätze zur Erläuterung des Wesens der Thiere,” in Fichtes Werke, ed. I.H. Fichte, 
hereafter W, 11 vols (Berlin: de Gruyter, 1971), at W 11, 362-7. 
9  In his 1802 Lectures on Geography, Kant writes “true history is nothing but a continuous 
geography” (AK IX, 161). 
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the latter obstacle, the indiscoverability of ground. This is why Kant insists that 
“in transcendental philosophy, the only questions to which we have a right to 
demand a sufficient answer bearing on the constitution of the object, and from 
which the philosopher is not permitted to excuse himself on the plea of their 
impenetrable obscurity, are the cosmological” (KRV A478/B506). 
These cosmological-epistemological concerns recall Schelling’s accounts 
of transcendental philosophy’s “derivative” character with respect to the 
philosophy of nature which alone is capable of grounding it. “There is an 
idealism of nature, and an idealism of the I. To me, the former is the original, and 
the latter the derivative,” he writes, the reason for which “lies in things” (SW IV, 
83-4).
10
 From Fichte to McDowell, protests against naturalism in philosophy 
have assumed that were it conceded that nature precedes consciousness, or that 
“it is not because there is thinking that there is being, but because there is being 
that there is thinking,” 11  then the transcendental project, the hallmark of 
philosophical modernity, must be abandoned. I contend that such a view stems 
from an insufficient naturalism, since for any such position, either all existents 
are instances of nature, or they are not. In the latter case, naturalism affirms itself 
ontologically parochial and so on its own testimony cannot provide a complete 
account of being. If it is claimed that any existent not part of nature does not 
therefore exist in reality, then such a naturalism finds itself in the odd position of 
affirming a domain of existents that have it in common that they do not exist. 
Accordingly, the only adequate naturalism must be able to account for all 
domains of being, including the transcendental. Our question therefore is what a 
naturalistic account of the transcendental must look like. Moreover, since 
philosophers are more accustomed to considering transcendental philosophy as 
proto-phenomenological (Husserl), as epistemology (Allison, Korsgaard)
12
 or as 
reducibly practical (Fichte, Brandom), recasting it in terms of the twin demands 
for (a) the unconditioned ground, and (b) sufficiency in explanations of object 
constitution with cosmological scope, seeks to reopen the naturalistic and 
ontological dimensions of that philosophy to contemporary scrutiny. In doing so, 
moreover, we will present transcendental philosophy, following Ernst Cassirer, 
                                                          
10 It is this repeatedly emphasized difference that Hegel omits from his symmetrical, antecedence-
independent account of Schelling’s two “grounding sciences” in the Differenzschrift, Trans. Walter 
Cerf and H.S. Harris, The Difference Between Fichte’s and Schelling’s System of Philosophy 
(Albany: SUNY, 1977), 161: “In transcendental philosophy, the subject, as intelligence, is the 
absolute substance and nature is an object, an accident. In the philosophy of nature, the absolute 
substance is nature, of which the subject, intelligence, is only an accident. Now the higher 
standpoint is not one that suspends one or the other of the two sciences, and asserts that the subject 
alone, or the object alone is the Absolute. Nor is it a standpoint which mixes the two sciences 
together.” That Hegel’s analysis here proceeds by way of the first of the categories of relation—
substance and accident—provides an index of his own extension of reciprocity to nature and 
transcendental philosophy, betraying the fundamentality of transcendentalism for him. 
11  F.W.J. Schelling, The Grounding of Positive Philosophy. The Berlin Lectures, trans. Bruce 
Matthews (Albany: SUNY, 2007), 203n (SW XIII, 161n). 
12 For a discussion of epistemological as opposed to ontological accounts of Kant’s transcendental 
philosophy, see Eric Watkins, Kant and the Metaphysics of Causality, hereafter Causality 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 317-326. 
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as the attempt to “attain knowledge of the forces that generate this knowledge 
and have brought it forth.”13 
 
Three Forms of Transcendentalism 
 
From Kant may be derived three accounts of transcendental philosophy. The first 
presents that philosophy as answering the question quid juris or deducing the 
entitlement of a judgment to empirical application in accordance with the 
originating faculty. It asks “of the origin of the modes in which we know objects, 
in so far as that origin cannot be attributed to the objects” (KRV A55-6/B80). 
This is a grounding account of transcendentalism, as it posits a sequence of 
grounds that always terminate in the transcendental ideal, or the concept of an 
absolute ground.
14
 As Kant says (KRV A566/B594), “the existence of 
appearances, which is never self-grounded, requires us to look around for 
something different from all appearances, that is, for an intelligible object in 
which this contingency may terminate.” It is also a heterogeneity-preserving 
transcendentalism, insofar as an absolute ground can never be in principle 
available to experience and the schematization of which would therefore fall foul 
of transcendental philosophy’s proscription of transcendent or dogmatic claims. 
As a consequence of this division, nature, in so far as it is phenomenal, is raised 
above what grounds appearances, which ground must accordingly be other than 
nature; what grounds nature is, moreover, “an abyss for human reason” so that, 
taken strongly, the unground of human reason is the ground of a nature that is 
now phenomenal only, transfigured into an accident of the subject. The 
heterogeneity so preserved therefore severs nature from its appearing and its 
causing. 
Accordingly, transcendental logic, which has as its function to consider 
origins as arising other than from objects, subjects questions of grounds to 
transcendental relocation in order that they can no longer be uncritically affirmed 
                                                          
13 See Ernst Cassirer, The Philosophy of Symbolic Forms, vol. 4, The Metaphysics of Symbolic 
Forms, trans. John Michael Krois (New Haven CT: Yale University Press, 1996), 150. 
14 For a discussion of the concept “absolute ground” in Kant’s pre-critical and critical works, see 
Paul W. Franks, All or Nothing: Systematicity, Transcendental Arguments and Skepticism in 
German Idealism, hereafter All or Nothing (Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press, 2005), 35-
43, 204-211. Franks notes that Kant’s most discussed transcendental arguments—the 
Transcendental Deduction and the Refutation of Idealism—“do not argue for an unconditioned 
condition,” although the deduction of freedom in the Critique of Practical Reason does (All or 
Nothing, 207). But he also notes (p. 43) Kant’s overt articulation of the question in the first 
Critique: “If one asks . . . whether there is anything different from the world which contains the 
ground of the world order . . . then the answer is: without a doubt” (KRV A696/B725). Franks here 
interprets Kant as arguing that, “the requirement that genuine groundings terminate in an absolute 
is an unavoidable demand of reason,” yet this seems to contravene the ban on dogmatic assertions 
concerning what does not figure in experience (All or Nothing, 46). The solution, argues Franks, is 
that Kant can assert that such an absolute ground exists, but not what it is or in what way. It is 
difficult, however, to see how asserting that X exists necessarily does not amount to characterizing 
how it exists. Despite this, it is clear that the concept “transcendental ground” plays a role in Kant’s 
critical speculative philosophy as well as in practical. 
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as empirical or dogmatic. Moreover, the division between unconditioned and 
conditioned grounds, and the reducibly transcendental concept furnished by the 
former and the interminably regressive series entailed by the latter, withdraws 
causality from the domain of ‘natural history’ in order to distribute it between 
antinomy-generating experience and blind, rational assertion. Thus critical 
transcendentalism works ultimately, as the Copernican revolution expressly 
signalled, to replace objects with the subject as the ground qua insuperable 
source of rational legitimacy.  
This is especially the case, as Robert Brandom has claimed,
15
 insofar as 
such a subject articulates such necessity simply by a commitment to reasoning 
entailed by the fact of reasoning. In reasoning, that is, a subject seeks to integrate 
the reasons for an action or judgment into the range of other reasons and 
commitments that subject claims to hold. To do so is, Brandom claims, “to 
synthesize an original unity of apperception.”16 Insofar as something original is, 
at first sight at least, not something that requires prior synthesis, the cited 
characterization further indicates the “recollective” function of reason he calls the 
“rational reconstruction” of the community of reasons such as Brandom finds 
recommended in Hegel.
17
 Accordingly the subject’s apperceptive capacity is not 
so much “original” in the sense of first as it is originative or productive of 
precisely those integrative and recollective synthesis which, as a ‘spontaneous’ 
act, is the ground in turn of the subject’s actual apperceptions, or ‘realizations’ of 
this fact. Reason is a commitment to reasons evident only in reasonings which 
are responsible, the subject realizes, for the subject articulated as related claims 
and commitments.  
While Brandom’s version of transcendentalism overtly acknowledges its 
debt to Kant and Hegel, its rational bootstrapping has a Fichtean genealogy. For 
Fichte as for Brandom, the primacy of the practical is evident not only in the 
content of overtly held normative commitments, but also in the rational practises 
that underlie such commitments. Attending reflectively to the constitution of 
such practises, Fichte demonstrates, entails the foundations of transcendental 
philosophy lie not in anything given, but only in what is made. This productivist 
transcendental philosophy is exemplary of philosophical activity in general as 
Brandom and many other idealists consider it.
18
 One paradigm of this is provided 
in Fichte’s account of the ‘Duties of the fine artist’ in The System of Ethics,19 
where the artist is said to “make the transcendental point of view the ordinary 
point of view.” The practical lesson concerning transcendental philosophy the 
artist furnishes is the transcendental lesson that “the world is something made” 
                                                          
15 What follows glosses pp. 9-16 of Robert Brandom, Reason in Philosophy (Cambridge MA: 
Harvard University Press, 2009), hereafter Reason. 
16 Brandom, Reason, 14. 
17 Ibid., 16 
18 See the discussion of Brandom and the forms of idealism occurring in contemporary philosophy 
in Jeremy Dunham, Iain Hamilton Grant and Sean Watson, Idealism. The History of a Philosophy 
(Stocksfield: Acumen, 2011). 
19 Johann Gottlieb Fichte, System of Ethics, hereafter Ethics, trans. and eds. Daniel Breazeale and 
Günter Zöller (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 2005). 
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and only from the ordinary point of view is it given. The artist therefore takes 
made-ness as given, as should the transcendental philosopher.
20
 This differs 
greatly from the role of art in Schelling’s philosophy, for which art must equally 
withdraw from and return to nature
21—where it must take leave of the blind 
operation of the living idea in order to form something which then becomes, to 
use Malevich’s concept, an “additional element” in nature, a new component in a 
suprematist ontology.
22
 At the same time, the emphasis this version of 
transcendental philosophy places on its productivity opens another dimension of 
that philosophy’s important and underexploited novelty. 
While these two accounts of transcendental philosophy dovetail to a 
certain extent, the first terminating in a disjunction and the second in a 
production monism, a third transcendentalism shares the grounding agenda of the 
first with the production monism of the second. It is one that, in Kant’s own 
philosophy, sought to articulate the disjunction between the objects of 
speculative and those of practical philosophy as occupants of one and the same 
dynamic field. Although explicitly discussed most extensively in the work known 
by Kant’s contemporaries as Transition from the Metaphysical Foundations of 
Natural Science to Physics but known since 1920 as the Opus postumum,
23
 its 
provenance is evident in changes in Kant’s philosophy of chemistry signalled in 
his introduction to S.T. Sömmering’s Über das Organ der Seele (1796). 24 
Crucially, it reconceives the movement of the transcendental not as vertical flight 
from immanence, so to speak, nor as orbit, but rather as transition. In place of the 
search for grounds or for a substrate, Kant recasts transcendental philosophy as 
the production of transitions; instead of bodies being accorded primacy both in 
his physics and metaphysics, they are considered generated, late products of 
forces. Such a recasting has important consequences regarding the categories of 
relation in the first Critique’s table of categories (KRV A80/B106), as we shall 
see. For the moment, however, we note that transition transcendentalism asserts 
the community of force and activity as necessary to a systematic metaphysics, 
and generates the concepts necessary to such a community in order to form 
experience such that from it such a community is derivable in turn. It thus 
                                                          
20 Fichte, Ethics, 334. 
21 Compare Schelling’s account in his lecture “Concerning the Relation of the Plastic Arts to 
Nature,” trans. Michael Bullock in Herbert Read, The True Voice of Feeling (London: Faber and 
Faber, 1957), 321-364 (SW VII, 289-330). 
22 See Kasimir Malevich, “An Introduction to the Theory of the Additional Element in Painting,” in 
The World as Non-Objectivity, ed. Troels Andersen, trans. Xenia Glowacki-Prus and Edmund T. 
Little (Copenhagen: Borgen, 1976), 147-194. 
23 Schelling gives this title in his 1804 obituary for Kant, SW VI, 8. It continued to be used until 
Erich Adickes’ Kants Opus postumum was published in 1920 as Kant-Studien Ergänzungsheft 50, 
trans. Eckart Förster, Opus postumum (OPP) (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993). 
24 AK XII, 33-5. See also Mai Lequan, La chemie selon Kant (Paris: Presses Universitaires de 
France, Alexander Rüger, 1995); idem, “Brain Water, the Ether, and the Art of Constructing 
Systems,” in Kant-Studien 86, 26-40; Michael Friedmann, Kant and the Exact Sciences 
(Cambridge: MA, Harvard University Press, 1992), 264-290; and Martin Carrier, “Kant’s Theory 
of Matter and His Views on Chemistry,” in Eric Watkins, ed., Kant and the Sciences (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2001), 205-230. 
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integrates the bootstrapping productivity hitherto ascribed solely to pure practical 
reason, and later to be exploited by Fichte and Brandom alike, with a solution to 
the problem of grounding that drives the first Critique. In so doing, transition 
transcendentalism offers an alternative to that production transcendentalism for 
which, as for Brandom, “all transcendental constitution is social institution,”25 
without sacrificing antecedent nature to the epistemological impenetrability that 
critical transcendentalism’s division of grounds condemns it. The cost of this 
accommodation, however, is that transcendental philosophy must now rest 
content with reason and nature settling symmetrically opposite one another such 
that neither may be derived from the other, forsaking therefore the derivation 
quest that underlies transcendental logic. As Brandom has it “the insight that 
even natures have histories” must be balanced by “rationality . . . imposing the 
obligation to construe histories as revelatory of natures.” 26  The question, 
therefore, is whether transition transcendentalism could in fact resolve the 
problem of the relation of phenomenal to non-phenomenal nature, a problem that 
has given currency to transcendental approaches amongst philosophers of 
quantum mechanics,
27
 given that it entails the elimination of the question of 
origin from transcendentalism’s remit. What this means, in short, is that the 
transition between physics and metaphysics is accomplished at the cost of causal 
relations underlying reason. To this extent, transition transcendentalism remains 
a critical solution to the problem of nature and freedom: nature, that is, remains 
phenomenal not solely such that time and space follow and therefore causality 
takes place only within the field of appearance, but also such that it is felt. 
Transition transcendentalism, therefore, expands the domain of the aesthetic to 
furnish the foundations of reciprocity or community between activity and force. 
As a result, objects and subjects become reciprocally constitutive such that there 
neither are nor can be entities or events without their being capable in principle 
of impinging upon the sensitive faculties of a subject, just as the “formal 
principles of the phenomenal universe . . . are the schemata and conditions of 
everything sensitive in human cognition” (AK II, 398).28 
Kant’s account of cosmological as aesthetic cognition will be echoed in 
two alternative solutions Cassirer will give in the late 1920s to the problem of 
form, to the problem, that is, of “how it is possible for the form of being to be 
pictured in the form of knowledge:” either by an analytic relation obtaining 
                                                          
25 Brandom, Articulating Reasons. An Introduction to Inferentialism (Cambridge MA: Harvard 
University Press, 2000), 34. 
26 Reason, 112. 
27 See, for example, Bernard d’Espagnat, Physics and Philosophy (Princeton: Princeton University 
Press, 2006) and the references cited by Gabriel Catren in “A Throw of the Quantum Dice Will 
Never Overturn the Copernican Revolution,” in Collapse V (2009): 453-499, especially M. Bitbol, 
P. Kerszberg and J. Petitot, eds., Constituting Objectivity: The Transcendental Approaches of 
Modern Physics (Berlin: Springer, 2009). 
28 As Kant says in his “Inaugural Dissertation,” trans. and ed. David Walford and Ralf Meerbote, 
Theoretical Philosophy 1755-1770 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992), 391, hereafter 
Theoretical. 
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between them, as in Parmenides’ “thinking and being are the same,”29 or by the 
causal or inductive series typified by Empedocles’ “We see Earth by means of 
Earth, Water by means of Water,” or by the knowing being a part of the known.30 
Regardless of which version of identity Kant had assumed in the Inaugural 
Dissertation, since all of these three accounts of the identity of cosmos and logos, 
of nature and reason, whether analytic, inductive-causal, or mereological-
participatory, are precisely rejected in the first Critique, what must be explained 
by transcendental philosophy is how they come to be divided in the first place.
31
 
 
From the Categories of Relation to the Problem of Form 
 
In the B edition of KRV Kant adds two comments concerning the Table of 
Categories and its relation to the “scientific form” of philosophy, or the 
“momenta of a projected speculative science,” he considers that table to provide. 
The Second Comment notes that “the third category in each class always arises 
from the combination of the second category with the first.”32 Thus, in terms of 
the class of quality, Reality is primitive, Negation derived, and Limitation their 
product; similarly, Totality is the product of Plurality derived from Unity; and 
Community or Reciprocity the product of Substance and Accident and Cause and 
Effect. The categories of Modality are antinomic, and do not concern us here.
33
 
                                                          
29  I use the simplest translation of Parmenides’ Fragment B3, as offered by E.D. Phillips, 
“Parmenides on Thought and Being,” Philosophical Review 64 (1955): 546-60, as avoiding either 
an objectivist (“it is the same thing that can be thought and that can be”) or the subjectivist (“to 
think is the same thing as to be”) accounts. See F.M. Cornford’s discussion of this problem in Plato 
and Parmenides (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1939), 33-4 and 34n. 
30 Empedocles Fragment 109, as cited and discussed by Ernst Cassirer, The Philosophy of Symbolic 
Forms, vol. 4, The Metaphysics of Symbolic Forms, trans. and eds. John Michael Krois and Donald 
Phillip Verene (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1996), 194-5. Schelling first advances 
Empedocles’ thesis as both causal and inductive, characterizing the principle as “like produces 
like,” in his 1806 “Preliminary Characterization of the Medical Standpoint on Naturphilosophical 
Principles,” SW VII, 281. See also F.W.J. Schelling, Philosophical Inquiries into the Nature of 
Human Freedom, trans. James Gutmann (Chicago: Open Court, 1986), 8, hereafter Freedom, where 
the emphasis is on the roots of recognisability lying in nature: “Whosever takes physical theory as 
his point of departure . . . knows that the doctrine ‘like is recognized by like’ is a very ancient one. . 
. . But, alas, those who are unsympathetic towards science traditionally regard it as a kind of 
knowledge which is quite external and lifeless like conventional geometry.”  
31  This is the problem discussed at length in the “Introduction” to Schelling’s Ideas for a 
Philosophy of Nature, trans. Errol E. Harris and Peter Heath (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1988), 9-42 (SW II, 11-56), hereafter Ideas. 
32 KRV B110. See Schelling own remarks to this effect in his discussion of Plato’s concept of cause 
in his 1794 Timaeus, ed. Hartmut Buchner (Stuttgart Bad-Canstatt: Frommann-Holzboog, 1994), 
27-8, 69-72, and in his “Treatise Explicatory of the Idealism in the Science of Knowledge,” trans. 
Thomas Pfau, in Idealism and the Endgame of Theory. Three Early Essays by F.W.J. Schelling 
(Albany: State University of New York Press, 1994), 71-2 (SW I, 356-7). 
33  See my “Prospects for Post-Copernican Dogmatism: The Antinomies of Transcendental 
Naturalism,” Collapse V (2009): 415-451, for a discussion of the categories of modality and their 
importance in post-Kantian philosophy. 
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We owe to Schelling the “astute point” 34  that the categories of relation—
Substance and Accident, Cause and Effect, and Community or Reciprocity (KRV 
A80/B106)—are less one class of categories amongst others than the original 
from which the others are derived. In consequence, Schelling claims that the 
“forms of thought” identified in the Table of Categories can in fact be reduced to 
one Urform which “grounds all the others.”35 Two questions will arise from this: 
first, how far from Kant’s understanding of the categories is Schelling’s 
intervention? And second, what consequences follow from the account Schelling 
makes explicit? 
 
1. Kant’s account of the pure concepts of the understanding in general 
(KRV A77-80/B102-5) does not present them as given but as products of 
pure syntheses following an order. A synthesis is pure when the 
manifold thus synthesized contains nothing empirical, as for example the 
manifold of space and time. It is an “effect [Wirkung]” of the 
imagination. There is a distinct order to pure synthesis: first must be the 
manifold of pure intuition; second the imagination synthesizes this 
manifold, that is, “goes through it in a certain way, takes it up, and 
connects” it; “the concepts that give unity to this pure synthesis” are 
third, and “consist only in the representation of this necessary synthetic 
unity.” The B edition comment therefore implicates this synthetic order 
in the production of the pure concepts of the understanding themselves. It 
is as though the syntheses are themselves derived from an analysis of the 
pure manifold of space (distribution and individuation) and time 
(sequence). 
 
In other words, the Second Comment follows through the implications of the 
necessity of synthesis in the production of any cognition whatever. Schelling is 
correct in ascribing fundamentality to the Categories of Relation exactly and only 
if the syntheses can be understood causally, exactly as the description of 
synthesis as an “effect [Wirkung] of the power of imagination” (KRV A78/B103) 
does. In this regard, Kant produces the outline of a transcendental account of 
transcendental concept production. That is, if the pure manifold of intuition is 
itself sufficient to furnish the material for the categories, then their synthesis 
produces cognition of the formation of forms of knowing (concepts), rather than 
knowledge of experience, or of what Kant calls “Nature.” Not all transcendental 
arguments are therefore concerned to demonstrate the subjective source of the 
                                                          
34
 See Franks, All or Nothing, 85, n.1, for a discussion of Schelling’s “astute point” concerning the 
original or foundational role of the categories of relation not only with respect to the table of 
categories at KRV A80/B106, but also with respect to the form of transcendental philosophy in 
general. Franks cites Schelling’s first essay, “On the Possibility of a Form for All Philosophy,” 
hereafter Form, trans. Fritz Marti in F.W.J. Schelling, The Unconditional in Human Knowledge. 
Four Early Essays (Lewisburg PA: Bucknell University Press, 1980), 52 (SW I, 107). 
35 Forms 52 (SW I, 107). 
11 
 
faculties, and not all a priori space and time is formed according to the world of 
experience. 
 
2. As to the consequences of the fundamentality of relation, they follow the 
implications of this causal-transcendental account of concept production. 
The first of these concerns the role of dynamics as the “grounding 
science” of philosophy that Schelling’s first edition Introduction to the 
Ideas for a Philosophy of Nature generates, and its implications for 
grounding science, or the science of grounds, in general. The second then 
concerns the implications of a dynamic ground for concept production, 
for the emergence of philosophical form, and thus for the range of 
possible objects of transcendental philosophy as such. 
 
Both the above accounts emerge from considerations of form that are not 
themselves merely formal precisely because they are concerned with the question 
of the formation of form. It is transcendental to the extent that an argument may 
be accounted transcendental just when it (a) rises above its content to (b) inquire 
after the conditions of that content. Precisely such an inquiry is undertaken by 
Schelling’s Introduction to the Ideas, and it is from this transcendental inquiry 
that it follows that the science of grounding cannot not be a naturephilosophy. 
The precise manner in which the problem of nature inflects transcendental 
philosophy concerns the necessity of priority. The manner in which 
transcendental philosophy inflects the philosophy of nature consists in (a) what 
follows from the extension of transcendental arguments from tracking cognitions 
to their apperceptive grounds to problematizing the grounds of apperception; and 
(b) how ideation, if generated, invests world. 
 The Introduction forms a continuous argument from which the entire 
basis, form, and problems of a “grounding science” is to arise.36 It addresses the 
possibility of separation, the nature of freedom, the constitution of matter, the 
causes and the consequences of confusing a transcendental with a dualistic 
account of the emergence of concepts, under the rubric of the problems which a 
philosophy of nature has to solve. Following an initial statement on the theme of 
why it is that philosophy (a) must arise because (b) an answer to the question of 
what it is cannot be given immediately, the argument begins by asking, “How a 
world outside us, how a Nature and with it experience, is possible” (SW II, 12, 
Ideas 10). Because implicit in this manifestly transcendental question is the 
separation between world and representation [Vorstellung],
37
 and because this 
separation has not itself been derived, Schelling asks after its conditions. The 
                                                          
36  “My object, rather, is first to allow natural science itself to arise philosophically 
[philosophischentstehenzulassen], and my philosophy is itself nothing else than natural science.” 
Ideas, 5 (SW II, 6). 
37 Harris’ and Heath’s translation consistently gives “idea” for both Vorstellung and Idee. That the 
text of the Introduction is an extended examination of the presuppositions of transcendental 
philosophy and what is necessary in order to ground that philosophy remains entirely unclear from 
the translation as a result. I have therefore amended the translation accordingly. 
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separation between world and representation must be made if nature, regarded as 
mechanism, cannot be held responsible for the production of my representations; 
it can be made if there can be “no native sons of freedom,” which turns out 
therefore to supply an uncaused separation. But how, if freedom is uncaused, i.e., 
steps outside the causal sequence of mechanism, can it step back into it in order 
to effect anything within it? If an uncaused cause cannot in turn cause effects in 
what cannot affect it, then such a cause can only cause effects within a world that 
must henceforth be separated from the mechanically causal one. 
 This is where transcendental philosophy ends up if it denies the relation 
between nature and representation [Vorstellung]: “intellect and thing inhabit two 
worlds, between which there is no bridge,”38 wasting mental power against an 
imaginary world. Power that is not wasted is therefore directed against a world 
which has influence upon minds. Accordingly, between mind and world “no rift 
must be established; contact and reciprocal action must be possible between the 
two,”39 making the world a community of forces, just as follows from making the 
Categories of Relation fundamental. 
Yet two things obstruct this one world account: the first is that if 
representations and world are of the same, mechanical kind, so that the latter 
causes the former, then “they precede representations.” If things precede 
representations and so can’t be represented, we can never know them. Since, 
however, I do represent, I ask how this is possible. In so doing, I “raise myself 
above the representation” and thereby “survey representing itself and the whole 
fabric of representations beneath” me. Hence arises the concept of myself as 
noumenal, as something that “has being in itself [Seyn in sichselbst],” but at a 
cost: in that “I adopt a position where no external force can reach me,” I exempt 
myself from the world, so that “the two hostile beings mind and matter 
separate”40—not, of course, in reality, but only as regards how I represent myself, 
i.e., transcendentally. Conversely, transcendentalism cannot consist in world 
invention on dynamic grounds. 
 The second obstacle concerns the theory that the matter that underlies 
nature and therefore my representations is inert. If so, then it must be caused, and 
these causes must lie outside it. Alternatively, matter causes, in which case it is 
false to consider it “inert,” since it “has forces.”41 It is obvious however, argues 
Schelling, that to say ‘matter has forces’ is not to explain anything, since if 
matter has forces, then these are mere accidents of matter and do not inhere 
necessarily in it, so that we retain the inert concept of matter and have no 
conception of how the one interacts with the other. Perhaps forces are, as the 
Newtonians say, “implanted” in matter; but what would this “implanting” that is 
neither force nor matter be, and how could it take place? For we “know only how 
                                                          
38 J.G. Fichte, Science of Knowledge, trans. Peter Heath and John Lachs (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1982), hereafter Science. References are first to Fichtes Werke (W), 11 vols., ed. 
I.H. Fichte (Berlin: de Gruyter, 1971), at W I, 436, Science 17. 
39 Ideas, 10-11 (SW II, 13). 
40 Ideas, 13 (SW II, 16). 
41 Ideas, 20 (SW II, 26). 
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. . . force itself works against force; but how effects can be produced on 
something which originally is not force, we have no conception at all.”42  
 Schelling’s “result” is that the separation to which I “raise myself” is a 
separation that is itself transcendental rather than actual or wirklich. That is, it 
must be an ideal separation that arises derivatively from a community of 
substances without which representing would not be possible at all. Yet as an 
ideal separation, its derivation from the nature of which it is a product is actual. 
In this sense, Schelling’s arguments constitute a transcendental derivation of the 
transcendental itself not as an artefact of a subjectivity, but of nature. Hence the 
Introduction’s triumphant conclusion:  
 
For what we want is not that Nature should coincide with the laws of our 
mind by chance . . . but that she herself, necessarily and originally, should 
not only express but even realize, the laws of our mind, and that she is, and is 
called, Nature only insofar as she does so.
43
 
 
Moreover, it is clear that the identity presupposed in this productivist account of 
how nature realizes the laws of mind is of the inductive-causal or Empedoclean 
rather than the mereological or part-whole sort that is often presupposed by and 
for Romantic philosophies of Nature.
44
 
What then are the consequences concerning the form of philosophy if the 
Categories of Relation are basic? Firstly, we must reconceive form as forms of 
motion, as inherently spatiotemporal rather than reducibly spatial, i.e., as 
stemming already from the synthesis of pure intuition. Hence Schelling’s 
provision of the categorial forms consequent upon dynamics being the 
“grounding science” of a philosophy of nature: 
 
1. Quantitative motion, which is proportional only to the quantity of 
matter—gravity; 
2. Qualitative motion, which is appropriate to the inner constitution of 
matter—chemical motion; 
3. Relative motion, which is transmitted to bodies by influence from 
without (by impact) mechanical motion. 
 
It is these three possible motions from which natural science engenders 
and develops its entire system.
45
 Where for Kant and Fichte, organic form issues 
from the reciprocity of cause and effect, of substance and accident, for Schelling 
                                                          
42 Ideas, 17 (SW II, 24), translation mine. 
43 Ideas, 41-2 (SW II, 55-6).  
44 See “The Natural History of the Unthinged,” chapter 4 of my Philosophies of Nature after 
Schelling, 2008, hereafter Nature, for a discussion of linear and nonlinear accounts of the 
Grundform problem. 
45 Ideas, 22 (SW II, 28). It is important to note that this table of categories already pre-empts 
Schelling’s derivation of mechanism from the community of forces he calls “organization”—
importantly, not organism—in F.W.J. Schelling, On the World Soul, trans. I.H. Grant, Collapse VI 
(2010): 66-95, at 90-92 (SW II, 348-350). 
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it provides the system of motions from which natural science—the thinkability of 
nature—arises. If the form of science is his focus, this is because a science is (a) 
derivative and (b) therefore derived from something. But it is precisely the 
ground of all derivation that the research into forms is supposed to supply. 
 We are left, then, with a problem, not unlike that of assigning priority to 
function or to structure in morphology:
46
 how are we to conceive of a 
fundamental form, the form of all science and a fortiori of the “grounding 
science,” given the insuperability of motion? How is fundamentality to be 
exhibited if it entails, as does a causal understanding of the origins of our 
Vorstellungen, an equally insuperable precedence? 
 
What Must Transcendental Philosophy Become? 
On Fields, Forms and Seinssphären 
 
We noted above the two uses that Kant made of extended reciprocity, that is, the 
organic and the dynamic. The definition of “the form of an object” as consisting 
in “being bounded [Begrenzung]” (KUK AK V, 244) provides a certain insight 
into the problem of form as regards objects: the object’s being bounded entails 
that it be set apart from or set off against its ground. Objects, that is, possess or 
inhere in what Husserl, in his discussion of Kant in the Crisis, calls Seinssphären, 
“spheres of being”. Although it is not a Kantian term, it introduces the concept of 
sphere or “field” into transcendental philosophy. By it, Husserl means to indicate 
what may otherwise be called the ontic domains of the special sciences. Kant 
attributes “actual validity” to the “truths and methods” of those sciences precisely 
to the extent that they enter into the constitutive fabric of transcendental 
philosophy. The particular sciences of which Kant makes such use, most clearly 
in the B edition KRV, are chemistry and mathematics, specifically, arithmetic 
and geometry. Chemistry to the extent that Kant acknowledges that he owes to it 
the experimental method that stipulates synthesis as the productive corollary of 
analysis,
47
 such that “Where the understanding has not previously combined, it 
cannot dissolve” (KRV B130). Arithmetical propositions cease to exemplify 
analytic truths and come instead to embody synthetic judgments (B15f); and 
geometry as an a priori science rather than, as would be demonstrated in the 
following century, consequent upon a posteriori assumptions concerning the 
nature of space (B40-41). As Jules Vuillemin has noted, transformations in the 
sciences make the determination of the conditions of possible experience “the 
                                                          
46 “The contrast between the teleological attitude, with its insistence on the priority of function to 
structure, and the morphological attitude, with its conviction of the priority of structure to function, 
is one of the most fundamental in biology.” E.S. Russell, Form and Function: A Contribution to the 
History of Animal Morphology (London: John Murray, 1916), 78. See also Timothy Lenoir, The 
Strategy of Life (Dordrecht: Reidel, 1982).  
47 See the remarks on Stahl in the B edition Preface (Bxiii and n) and the footnote concerning the 
“experiment of pure reason” at Bxxi. 
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most elusive concept in transcendental philosophy” 48  which, in the present 
context, demonstrates the effects of the composition of the transcendental from 
Seinssphären. Anything given, that is, determines the transcendental as the 
transcendental of what is given: the double demand of chemical epistemology, 
that an object remains unknown even after analysis should synthesis not follow 
it, makes transcendental philosophy productivist to the extent that synthesis may 
equally precede as succeed analysis. The knowable and the produced become 
coextensive, but at the cost of the unknowability of production. 
If Seinssphären are not beings themselves, but rather penumbra of 
objects’ relations, they would be determined transcendentally in accordance with 
the categories of relation: accidents to the substances that are objects, which 
latter are the effects of causes belonging amongst these relations, and into which 
therefore they enter relations of community. To the extent that the categories of 
relation are considered dynamically, that is, as resulting in such community 
however, objects are their causal relations, making substance and accident 
inseparable. Two problems can be derived from this. First, if form is the being 
bounded of an object, and the synthesis of the categories resets those boundaries 
around the causal histories and futuritions
49
 amongst the reciprocities constituting 
that object, the boundaries that determine an object’s form must now lie at the 
termini of the series, opening form once again to the problem of the “infinite 
extent of creation” Kant investigates in the Universal Natural History.50 Second, 
are the dynamics by means of which the transcendental object, whatever its 
extent, is produced, part of that object or its Seinssphäre or not? If the object is to 
be an object, and thus be bounded against a ground, then these dynamics cannot 
be part of it; if, on the other hand, the object includes its relations, then its 
production must be included, but can never produce an object. If there are 
objects, that is, then form must either be bounded against its ground once and for 
all, such that the form in which objects are given already includes 
spatiotemporal determination; or the forming of form is not settled, so that the 
form of all forms, the Urform, is itself formless in the sense of producing all 
forms, and therefore the form of all forms to the extent that it is the form of their 
production. 
I will make one further remark with regard to these problems which, it is 
worth recalling, have as their source the application of Kant’s Second Remark on 
the Table of Categories to the Categories of Relation. To the extent that these 
problems remain determined by the substance-accident metaphysical fundament 
                                                          
48 Jules Vuillemin, “Kant’s ‘Dynamics’: Comments on Tuschling and Förster,” in Eckart Förster, 
ed., Kant’s Transcendental Deductions:. The Three ‘Critiques’ and the ‘Opus postumum’ (Stanford 
CA: Stanford University Press, 1989), 247. 
49 In “The Question Whether the Earth is Aging, Physically Considered” (AK I, 193-213), Kant’s 
solution is not to seek age in the earth’s past, but in its capacity for a future. “Age is not a measure 
of past time, but of a projected future duration” (AK I, 195). He borrows Leibniz’s term 
futuritionem from the latter’s Theodicy § 36-7 in the “New Elucidation of the First Principles of 
Metaphysical Cognition” (AK I, 400), trans. in Theoretical, 23. 
50 Immanuel Kant, Universal Natural History and Theory of the Heavens, trans. Stanley L. Jaki 
(Edinburgh: Scottish Academic Press, 1981), 148-161, AK I, 306-322. 
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that grounds the emergent reciprocity at the summit of the Categories of 
Relation, the introduction of Seinssphären brings with it the prospective 
transition from substance to field ontologies. At the same time, however, it alerts 
us to a problem regarding the determination of these spheres of being with regard 
to their adequacy vis-à-vis the morphogenesis of fields: why would beings and 
their relations all form spheres? What would account for the geometrical 
homogeneity? The only form fields qua fields are determined in accordance with 
is the form from which they are determined. As Vuillemin notes, fields vary in 
strength according to its producer and its object such that two fields may not be 
‘isomorphic’ with respect to one another.51 If what is given with respect to the 
formation of any field is the strength of the forces involved in its production, then 
what is given is precisely the producing of that field, so that, once again, what is 
given determines the transcendental as the transcendental of what is given. What 
is given but never available is, in every case, what cannot be apperceptively 
reproduced because it exceeds this as its source. In this sense what is given is 
formless production. 
Yet what is transcendental in transcendental philosophy is the “rising 
above” what is given to transform what is given into something taken or made.52 
Transcendental philosophy has always been concerned with the production of 
objects. It is exemplary, therefore, of transcendental philosophy that it can accept 
both that “the ultimate knowledge from experience is this, that a universe exists; 
this proposition is the limit of experience itself;” and “that a universe exists is 
only an idea [Idee],”53 where the orbit of subject around object and object around 
subject is itself propelled into a “dependence both as it ascends and as it 
descends” (KUK AK V, 372), into a series without end. 
 Insofar as it does this, transcendental philosophy takes from what is 
given, insofar as what is given is its own source, its “being derived.” In 
consequence, transcendental philosophy is the inquiry into the form of all forms, 
or into the unconditioned ground, just as reason demands. Since as we have seen, 
no form can be ascribed to all forms if form is determined as Begrenzung, as 
“being bounded,” the form of all forms cannot have bounds, and “being 
bounded” must be a rejection of form. The form universal with respect to all 
forms is, in consequence, the form that encompasses the derivation of the derived 
as the ground of the produced, the morphogenetic field, in other words, from 
which the object arises, rather than the Seinssphären deriving from objects. 
“Being derived,” not “being bounded,” is the form of all form, and in order that 
being derived is possible, it is necessary that the origin of form is a dynamic 
                                                          
51
 “Kant’s introduction of the ether could be interpreted as an inkling of the notion of a field. Fields, 
however, are useful because they allow us to analyse forces into what produces the field and what it 
acts on. . . . But this principle, which applies exactly to electrical forces, is not exact for gravity if 
the field is too strong.” Vuillemin, Kant’s Transcendental Deductions, 246. 
52 In part I am here drawing on Jean-François Lyotard, Leçons sur l’analytique du sublime (Paris: 
Galilée, 1991), 222, and the profound analysis there of the role that thought makes of a nature 
rendered “unstructured or formless” by the discord of the faculties. 
53 Ideas, 18 (SW II, 24). 
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problem such that the form thus originated is dynamic in character. The form of 
all form, the product of transcendental philosophy as such, is itself derived 
necessarily from what precedes it, from what it cannot produce. And since it 
must contain “being derived” in itself, the form of all form is grounding precisely 
insofar as it refers to a ground producing transcendental philosophy, a nature that, 
insofar as it produces, is precisely this producing of forms, amongst which is the 
form of all forms that is realized only through transcendental philosophy. How 
else might this happen? This is why we may say, with Schelling, that what is 
common to all forms is not this or that boundedness (spherical, hyperspherical, 
planar, etc.), but rather, insofar as they are produced at all, motion: “the essence 
of absolute identity, insofar as it is the immediate ground of all reality, is 
force.”54 
The transcendental is the in itself formless form of all forms that is 
always posterior to the unconditioned that generates it and is its ground, and that 
augments being in turn. 
 
 
                                                          
54 SW IV, 145, translation modified from Michael Vater, “F.W.J. Schelling. Presentation of My 
System of Philosophy,” in Philosophical Forum, 32 (2001): 371. Vater translates Schelling’s Kraft 
at the end of the sentence as “power.” 
